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The relationship between sustainability economics and the capability approach has recently been explored.
Here I shall discuss this relationship, and argue that a study of the ontology underlying the capability ap-
proach can help us to see more clearly the interconnections between sustainability economics and the capa-
bility approach. In particular, the interpretations of the capability approach as an ontological exercise, which
have recently emerged in the literature, enable us to have a better understanding of the essential categories
used in the capability approach, and to establish a clearer connection between the capability approach and
sustainability economics.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Jérôme Ballet, Damien Bazin, Jean-Luc Dubois and François-Regis
Mahieu (2011) have recently explored the relationship between sus-
tainability economics and the capability approach, drawing upon the
contribution to sustainability economics of Stefan Baumgärtner and
Martin Quaas (2010). Here I shall extend this discussion, and argue
that a fruitful way to continue this debate is to take into account an
issue addressed by Baumgärtner and Quaas (2010), which is absent
from the discussion undertaken by Ballet, Bazin, Dubois and Mahieu
(2011), namely the topic of ontology. Once we understand the role
that ontological categories such as “internal relation” and “open sys-
tem” play within sustainability economics and the capability ap-
proach, we can then establish a clearer connection between the
capability approach, and sustainability economics, as deﬁned by
Baumgärtner and Quaas (2010).
2. The Capability Approach And Sustainability Economics
Baumgärtner and Quaas (2010) engage in an important analysis of
what sustainability economics is. In so doing, Baumgärtner and Quaas
(2010, p. 445) study various aspects of sustainability economics, such
as its “normative foundation, aims, subject matter, ontology, and gen-
uine research agenda”. Ballet, Bazin, Dubois and Mahieu (2011, p.1)
point out the following deﬁnition of sustainability economics put for-
ward by Baumgärtner and Quaas (2010):
“Sustainability economics is ethically founded in the idea of efﬁ-
ciency, that is non-wastefulness, in the use of scarce resources for
achieving the two normative goals of (i) the satisfaction of individ-
uals' needs and wants, and (ii) justice, including justice between
humans of present and future generations, and justice towards
Nature, within the setting of human-nature relationships over the
long-term and inherently uncertain future.” (Baumgärtner and
Quaas, 2010, p.447, cited also in Ballet, Bazin, Dubois and Mahieu,
2011, p.1)
On the ﬁrst issue pointed out in this deﬁnition, concerning the sat-
isfaction of human needs and wants, Ballet, Bazin, Dubois and Mahieu
(2011, p.1) note how the capability approach can help us to “go be-
yond the usual normative framework of individual resource alloca-
tion”. In fact, Amartya Sen (1992) argues that resources are only a
means to well-being, not the end we are seeking. Furthermore, Sen
notes that different human beings, placed in different situations,
will obtain different levels of well-being when endowed with the
same level of resources.
Thus, as Ballet, Bazin, Dubois and Mahieu (2011, p.1) note, the ca-
pability approach takes into account the “factors that block the con-
version of resources into real opportunities, and which
consequently reduce the ﬁeld of opportunities”, where these factors
“can be personal (disabilities, etc.), social (discrimination, exclusion,
etc.), or environmental (droughts, etc.).” — see also Wiebke Kuklys
(2005) or Ingrid Robeyns (2005) on conversion factors.
The differences between human beings are also captured by the
utilitarian framework of neoclassical economics, for different human
beings might have different utility functions, which reﬂect different
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desires. However, Sen (1992) notes that utilities reﬂect the person's
mental metric, not underlying needs that are essential given the nature
of humanbeings. Thus, it is necessary to focus on both needs anddesires,
and not only on desires, as the utilitarian framework often does.
Furthermore, to focus only on needs and desires is to focus only on
achievements. But, Sen (1992) argues, freedom to achieve is also fun-
damental. Ballet, Bazin, Dubois and Mahieu (2011, p.1) note how the
capability approach “enables us to go beyond the normative econom-
ic goal, i.e. the satisfaction of needs and desires.” The satisfaction of
needs and desires remains a legitimate economic goal. But human
well-being, according to Sen, does not consist only in the satisfaction
of needs and desires, since it also includes the freedom to choose.
Sen (1992) deﬁnes well-being in terms of human functionings,
where a human functioning is what a person is or does. Sen (1992)
uses the term capabilities to denote the potential functionings we
can achieve. Sen (1992, p. 60) distinguishes between well-being
achievement and well-being freedom. While well-being achievement
depends upon the functionings we achieve, well-being freedom de-
pends upon the capabilities, or potential functionings, that human be-
ings possess, and so wemust consider not only achieved functionings,
but also the freedom to achieve. To focus on capabilities rather than
on resources can lead us to a very different assessment of human
well-being, also in the context of sustainability economics, not only
because the relation between resources and different human beings
is taken into account, but also because freedom to achieve is also
taken into account.
Freedom of choice, concerning the capability space, is relevant not
only for the ﬁrst aspect pointed out by Baumgärtner and Quaas
(2010) in their deﬁnition of sustainability economics – concerning
the satisfaction of individuals' needs and wants, which can now be
seen in broader terms, as the expansion of the individuals' capability
space – but also for the second aspect pointed out by Baumgärtner
and Quaas (2010) in their deﬁnition of sustainability economics,
namely the issue of justice between generations and towards Nature.
Effectively, the future generations may came to value outcomes in
a different way than we do, so even if we provide them with a future
which, according to our standards, provides the outcomes which we
value most, those may not be the outcomes that the future genera-
tions value most, and hence freedom of choice is fundamental.
If future generations may have different preferences and values
than our own, (and if even our own preferences and values may
change with time), then freedom of choice, or a broader capability
space, must be provided, so that future generations (or maybe our
own generation) can have the capability to achieve the outcomes
they will value (whatever they may be), rather than the outcomes
we presently value.
3. Utilitarianism And The Capability Approach
The role of future preferences, within a conceptual framework com-
patible with utilitarianism, was emphasized by Henry Sidgwick (1874),
one of the founders of the Cambridge ‘welfare’ tradition, which inﬂu-
enced Sen — this issue is explained in more detail in Martins (2009).
Future preferences have also been discussed more recently by Kenneth
Arrow (1995) and Pattanaik and Xu (1998).
Sidgwick adopted a broad ethical framework, which emphasized
freedom of choice due to the possibility of change of preferences,
while making this approach compatible with a utilitarian framework.
But it is important to note that there are nevertheless various versions
of utilitarianism, and some are more distant from Sen's perspective
than others. While Jeremy Bentham provided an analysis of pleasure
and pain where subjective feelings could be reduced to a common
subjective metric, John Stuart Mill emphasized the fact that there
are different kinds of pleasure, without necessarily reducing them to
a unidimensional conception.
The perspective of Stuart Mill, which also inﬂuenced Sidgwick, is
more akin to Adam Smith's or Karl Marx's multidimensional concep-
tion of well-being, which Sen (2009) recovers, than to the unidimen-
sional conception of well-being that underpins mainstream
economics – see also Mozaffar Quizilbash (2008) on the relationship
between Sen's conception and the utilitarianism of Stuart Mill. Sen's
criticism is aimed especially at the utilitarian approaches which fol-
low Bentham, but not at Stuart Mill or Sidgwick.
There is an important similarity between the contribution of Sen,
and of authors like Smith and Sidgwick. This similarity is that these
authors attempted to provide a contribution which would include,
rather than exclude, other ethical perspectives. Smith (2002) divides
moral systems depending on whether they make virtue consist in
propriety, prudence or benevolence. Sidgwick (1874) also divides
moral systems into egoism, altruism and intuitionism. But both
Smith and Sidgwick attempt to ﬁnd common ground between these
competing systems, just like Sen (2009) attempts to ﬁnd a common
ground between various approaches.
From utilitarianism, Sen takes the emphasis on consequences, and
on how different human beings are affected in different ways. From
John Rawls's (1971) perspective, Sen takes the emphasis on opportu-
nities, and on a more objective perspective. The capability approach is
then developed as a perspective that focuses on the diversity of
human beings and on consequences (like utilitarianism), but using
objective human functionings (instead of subjective utility) as a
measure of well-being, while also emphasizing the potential to
achieve. Sen's critique of utilitarianism or resource based views
must be seen as a constructive dialogue, following the traditions of
Smith and Sidgwick.
4. The Critical Realist Relational Ontology And The Capability
Approach
However, there is an important way in which Sen's contribution
differs from the contributions of authors like Immanuel Kant or Rawls,
while following Smith, Mill and Marx, amongst others. Kant and
Rawls were essentially concerned with prescriptive a criterion (or
“method”, in Sidgwick's terms) for ethical decisions. Sen, on the other
hand, is concerned with the description of the space in which to assess
human well-being.
In fact, the capability approach is not a complete ethical theory.
For example, while utilitarianism provides a space in which to assess
well-being (the space of utility) and a criterion to choose between pos-
sible scenarios (themaximization of the sum of individual utilities), the
capability approach focuses only on the space. That is, it focuses on the
descriptive element (the space in which to assess well-being) rather
than on the prescriptive element (the criterion).
Effectively, the capability approach can be best interpreted as an
exercise in ontological description. Ontology is a study of the nature
of reality. While a scientiﬁc theory explains empirical observations,
identifying the causal mechanisms or structures which cause events,
ontology is concerned with the nature of the entities posited in scien-
tiﬁc theories. For example, if a scientiﬁc theory would attempt to ex-
plain the causal mechanisms through which the supply of moneymay
inﬂuence prices, an ontological enquiry would ask “what is money” or
“what is a price (or what is value)”.
Ontology is a topic also addressed by Baumgärtner and Quaas
(2010), in their discussion of the ontology of sustainability economics.
In Section 4, which is on the “Ontology of Sustainability Economics”
(Baumgärtner and Quaas, 2010: 447), they pose ontological questions
such as “What is the Human Being?”, “What is Nature?” or “What is
the Economy?” (Baumgärtner andQuaas, 2010: 448). The capability ap-
proach can be seen as an answer to one speciﬁc ontological question of
this sort, namely the question of “what is human well-being?” Notions
such as human functionings and human capabilities are developed by
Sen as an answer to these ontological questions: well-being achievement
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is characterized in terms of human functionings, and well-being free-
dom is seen in terms of potential functionings, or capabilities.
Recent contributions have highlighted the ontological nature of
the capability approach, and how the capability approach is particu-
larly compatible with a critical realist ontology, in which entities are
constituted by the very relations in which they stand — see Nuno
Martins (2006, 2007), Matthew Smith and Caroline Seward (2009)
and Ilse Oosterlaken (2011), who interpret the capability approach
in terms of a critical realist ontology; critical realism, in turn, has
been developed by authors like Margaret Archer, Roy Bhaskar,
Andrew Collier, Tony Lawson and Alan Norrie (1998).
This focus on a critical realist ontology can shed much light on the
connections between sustainability economics and the capability ap-
proach, because of the relational ontology it provides. The relation-
ship to Nature, and to other human beings, are central elements
pointed out by Baumgärtner and Quaas (2010). When Baumgärtner
and Quaas (2010, p. 448) discuss the ontological question of “What
is the Human being”, they consider relational aspects such as “How
and to what extent is the human being as a biological being deter-
mined by, and dependent upon, nature (homo biologicus)?”, or
“How and to what extent is a human individual determined by, and
dependent upon, social relationships (homo sociologicus)?”
The interpretation of the capability approach in terms of a critical
realist relational ontology can be fruitfully linked to these ontological
questions raised by Baumgärtner and Quaas (2010). According to the
critical realist relational ontology, human beings are constituted by
their relationships to Nature and society. This means that human be-
ings, Nature and society are internally related. Tony Lawson deﬁnes
internal relations in the following way:
“Aspects or items are said to be internally related when they are
what they are, or can do what they do, in virtue of the relation to
others in which they stand. In other words, internally related features
are, in part, constituted by such relations.” (Lawson, 2007b, p. 257)
However, according to critical realism, human individuals are not
completely determined by the relationships inwhich they stand. Rather,
human individuals and social structures are ontologically distinct enti-
ties, where neither can be reduced to the other.
In the critical realist relational ontology, social and technological
structures are the conditions of possibility for human activity, which
are transformed and reproduced by human activity— on the role of tech-
nology within a critical realist perspective, see also Lawson (2007a,
2010), or Oosterlaken (2011). Social and technological structures facili-
tate and constrain human agency, but do not determine the latter.
Baumgärtner and Quaas (2010, p. 448), when posing several onto-
logical questions, also ask “How and to what extent is a human being
free?”, which is a relevant question to ask once we consider human
beings to be (at least partly) constituted by their relations to Nature
and society. The answer that the critical realist ontology provides is
that the freedom of the human being depends upon the social and
technological structures, which are permanently reproduced and
transformed by human agency.
But because human agents and social structures are seen as onto-
logically distinct entities within critical realism, we can acknowledge
the causal inﬂuence of social structures on human agents, and of
human agents on social and technological structures, without
presupposing that human agency is determined by social and techno-
logical structures. Human agents are conditioned, but not deter-
mined, by social and technological structures, which shape the
boundaries of human freedom. The capability approach provides an
answer to this ontological question posed by Baumgärtner and Quaas
(2010, p. 448) too, of “How and to what extent is a human being
free?”, by focusing on the capability space, which can be seen as shaped
by social and technological structures — Martins (2006, 2007), Smith
and Seward (2009), Oosterlaken (2011).
There is often some reluctance concerning the acceptance of the
causal role of social structures, and thus Ortrud Leßmann (2011,
p.19) writes that “to keep social conditions as motives for individual
behaviour in mind, seems to match [sic] ethical individualism of the
CA [Capability Approach] much better than oversocialized approaches
such as social ontological ones (e.g. Martins, 2007, 2009)”.
However, as Ingrid Robeyns (2005, p. 107) argues, “we must dis-
tinguish between ethical individualism on the one hand, and method-
ological and ontological individualism on the other”. Robeyns (2005,
p. 108) also argues that “a commitment to ethical individualism is
not incompatible with an ontology that recognizes the connections
between people, their social relations, and their social embedment”
and concludes that “[t]he capability approach embraces ethical indi-
vidualism, but does not rely on ontological individualism.”
In fact, unless individuals are taken to be completely determined
by social structures, there is no reason why the recognition of the
causal role of social relationships must lead to an oversocialized ap-
proach, as Leßmann (2011, p.19) argues. As Sen writes:
“When someone thinks and chooses and does something, it is, for
sure, that person – and not someone else –who is doing these things.
But it would be hard to understand why and how he or she under-
takes these activities without some comprehension of his or her soci-
etal relations.
The basic issue was put with admirably clarity by Karl Marx
(1959: 104) more than a century and a half ago: ‘What is to be
avoided above all is the re-establishing of “Society” as an abstraction
vis-à-vis the individual’. The presence of individuals who think,
choose and act – a manifest reality in the world – does not make an
approach methodologically individualist. It is the illegitimate invok-
ing of any presumption of independence of the thoughts and actions
of persons from the society around them that would bring the feared
beast into the living room.” (Sen, 2009, p. 245)
The role of social relationships is thus central in inﬂuencing the
“thoughts and actions of persons”. The ontological study of the relation-
ships of human agents to nature and to society which Baumgärtner and
Quaas (2010, p. 448) discuss is an issuewhich can be fruitfully linked to
the recent explorations of the relations between the critical realist rela-
tional ontology and the capability approach.
5. Uncertainty And Ontology
In the interpretation of the capability approach in terms of the
critical realist ontology, we ﬁnd a conception where capabilities are
seen as causal powers, which emerge within a relational reality —
Martins (2006, 2007), Smith and Seward (2009), Oosterlaken
(2011). In this conception, capabilities have the power to provide
well-being, but whether such a potential is exercised or not depends
on context, or the existing set of relationships. In the literature on the
capability approach, this context is usually termed as the “conversion
factors” — see Kuklys (2005), Robeyns (2005) or Smith and Seward
(2009). But because capabilities are causal powers that may, or may
not, be exercised, there is always uncertainty concerning future
outcomes.
Within this conception, reality is seen as an open system, which is
a system in which constant conjunctions of the form “if event X then
event Y” do not always occur— see also Lawson (2007b). It is because
social reality and nature, are open systems, that uncertainty is always
present. In fact, it is not only social reality, but also natural reality, that
constitutes an open system. Thus, even natural sciences have to artiﬁ-
cially construct closed systems in laboratory experiments, inwhich con-
stant conjunctions of the form “if event X then event Y” occur, when
engaging in exact modeling — see Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson
and Norrie (1998).
Baumgärtner and Quaas (2010, p.447) point out, in their deﬁnition
of sustainability economics, “justice toward Nature, within the setting
of human-nature relationships over the long-term and inherently un-
certain future.” The fact that the future is uncertain means again that
the capability space of future generations must be a broad one, since
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they may have to deal with problems which we never imagined. Un-
certainty exists thus not only concerning what will be our future pref-
erences and values, but also concerning Nature. In fact, uncertainty is
relevant not only regarding future outcomes, but also regarding very
immediate and present outcomes, and how we assess them.
The fact that uncertainty exists, concerning not only Nature, but
concerning our preferences and values, means that we need a frame-
work which takes openness of outcomes into account. Capabilities, as
causal powers that may or may not be exercised, are constitutive ele-
ments of such an open system. When the capability approach is
interpreted in terms of a critical realist ontology, where capabilities
are seen as causal powers, the relationships between the capability ap-
proach and sustainability economics, as systematized by Baumgärtner
and Quaas (2010), can be seen in a clearer light, concerning not only re-
lations to Nature and social relationships, but also the open nature of
natural and social reality.
Ballet, Bazin, Dubois and Mahieu (2011) identify however two
shortcomings in the capability approach. First, as Flávio Comim
(2003) explains, the capability approach “is based on a static analysis,
and because of this it ignores a number of dynamic questions, not all
of which are related to the analysis of human/environment systems.”
(Ballet, Bazin, Dubois and Mahieu, 2011, p. 3). The second shortcom-
ing is that the capability approach “is an approach that does not ex-
plicitly take uncertainty into account” (Ballet, Bazin, Dubois and
Mahieu, 2011, p. 3).
However, if we see the capability approach as an ontological exer-
cise, which must be supplemented by further substantive theorizing,
we see that to provide a substantive treatment of dynamic problems
or uncertainty is beyond the scope of the capability approach. The ca-
pability approach provides an ontological framework for the descrip-
tion of human well-being where dynamics and uncertainty can be
accommodated, since it presupposes a processual, internally related,
and open reality — see Martins (2006, 2007), Smith and Seward
(2009), and Oosterlaken (2011). But it does not engage in a substan-
tive treatment of dynamic issues or uncertainty, since such an en-
deavor is beyond the scope of an ontological exercise. To do so,
further substantive work is necessary.
In fact, it is because the capability approach is essentially an onto-
logical exercise that when we look at more substantive issues, the ca-
pability approach will be found to be vague and theoretically
underspeciﬁed – see also Anand, Hunter, and Smith (2005) on the
theoretical under-speciﬁcation of the capability approach. The capa-
bility approach, as an answer to the ontological question of “what is
human well-being?”, must be supplemented with more substantive
analysis.
In this regard, sustainability economics and the capability ap-
proach can be fruitfully complementary. If the capability approach
provides only an answer to the ontological question of “what is
human well-being”, sustainability economics addresses the dynamic
issues and uncertainty which must be taken into account when en-
gaging in more substantive questions.
6. Conclusion
Ballet, Bazin, Dubois and Mahieu (2011, p.1) discuss how the ca-
pability approach can be a foundation for sustainability economics.
The capability approach is however an incomplete framework, in
the sense that it does not possess a theory of socio-economic process-
es. The capability approach provides instead a framework to describe
and evaluate social and economic outcomes, focusing on freedom to
choose, measured in terms of the expansion of the capability space.
In fact, the capability approach is essentially concerned with what
Baumgärtner and Quaas (2010) term as “ontology”, that is, an enquiry
on the nature of well-being, since it provides the categories that we
can use to answer to the ontological question of “what is human
well-being?”
The capability approach can bring a different perspective to the
central issues within sustainability economics pointed out by Ballet,
Bazin, Dubois and Mahieu (2011) when discussing the contribution
of Baumgärtner and Quaas (2010, p.447), concerning: the satisfaction
of individuals’ needs and wants; and justice, between humans of pre-
sent and future generations, and in human-nature relationships “over
the long-term and inherently uncertain future.” In fact, the capability
perspective shows how these aspects are deeply interconnected. It is
because future generations may face unpredictable and uncertain
scenarios, in a context where the preferences and values of future
generations may be different from ours, that the focus must be not
only on contemporary needs and desires, but on real capabilities.
The capability approach provides thus a broader perspective of the
ﬁrst issue pointed out by Baumgärtner and Quaas (2010), namely
human needs and desires, which enables us to accommodate the de-
mands of the second issue pointed out in the deﬁnition of Baumgärtner
and Quaas (2010), concerning intergenerational justice, and uncertainty.
But as an ontological exercise, the capability approach does not
provide a substantive answer to these issues. It provides an answer
to the ontological question of “what is human well-being”, rather
than to substantive issues within economic theory. This leads to a
theoretical under-speciﬁcation of the capability approach at a sub-
stantive level, which is a consequence of the fact that the capability
approach is essentially an ontological exercise.
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